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Abstract: The paper describes the latest change in the research on social and economic
development of states. This change is characterized mainly by a strong emphasis put
on the role of institutions as key instruments of reducing the development gap between
countries. It is argued that in the years after 1989 institutions have disappeared from
mainstream academia and major intellectual debates because of: (1) the widespread
belief in global convergence of capitalism and (2) the modernization theory which pre-
vailed in the social science in the 1990s. The article indicates that institutions were
once again brought into focus as a result of (1) a wider debate about the institutional
sources of growth and development sparked by Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Na-
tions Fail, (2) the beginning of the global economic crisis of 2008 triggered by the fall
of American investment bank Lehman Brothers (3) diversified consequences of the
economic crisis seen all over Europe and the USA which illustrate (4) the institutional
varieties of capitalism.
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Introduction
T
he purpose of this article is to present the latest change in the research
concerning the role of institutions in the processes of social and eco-
nomic development of states. The emphasis is put on one dimension of the
functioning of institutions, i.e. their role as effective instruments of reduc-
ing the development gap between countries in the world. In the article it is
argued that the institutional approach has gained a newfound popularity.
First of all, the opposition between institutions and structures, which has
held a crucial position in the history of academic reflection on long-term
development processes (longue durée), is characterized. Then two con-
cepts popular in the social science in the 1990s are described: a belief in
the global convergence of capitalism and the modernization theory. Both
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these concepts regarded external factors as basic impulses of develop-
ment; while at the same time they relegated institutions to a secondary
position.
It was indicated that the Post-Washington Consensus was the first sign
of a return of institutions into the mainstream of political and academic re-
flection as well as a symbolic caesura that marked the retreat from ideas
which dominated the last decade of the twentieth century. The global eco-
nomic crisis of 2008 was considered to be the crucial event as a result of
which institutions ultimately returned to the center of public debates and
development strategies. The renaissance of the institutional approach can
be observed in the debate following the global economic crisis, which fo-
cuses on the new sources of development in the Western world. It is argued
that the contemporary popularity of institutions results from the varied
consequences of the economic crisis, which are seen in different
socio-economic situations across the countries in Europe and the USA, re-
flecting different varieties of capitalism. Finally, conclusions drawn from
this new wave of popularity of institutions, which may be relevant also for
Poland, are presented.
It should be noted that institutions have been an object of reflection in
the social science since its birth. As it is argued, in the first decades of the
twentieth century, institutionalism was simply synonymous with political
science (Lowndes, 2006, p. 89). After the Great Depression of the 1930s,
the Second World War, the beginning of the Cold War and the behavioral
revolution, this approach was subjected to a strong criticism and under-
went a major transformation resulting in, among others, the acceptance of
a need for a broader definition of institutions. The approach was revived in
the form of new institutionalism which integrated diverse theoretical ap-
proaches and science disciplines (among others, political science and eco-
nomics) in the form of a broad scientific perspective. The issues discussed
in the paper cover only a small range of topics which are contained within
this lively, pluralistic and inspiring perspective.
Institutions and Structures
The distinction between institutions and structures is an important ele-
ment in the long history of academic reflection on the long-term processes
of social and economic development. Institutions, understood organiza-
tionally, are an entity; a specialized part of the whole; something that plays
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a certain role in some larger unit. Institutions, understood behaviorally,
are social “rules of the game”, deeply rooted norms and patterns of behav-
ior, interactions and social relations; and, more controversially, principles
and values shared by most members of a certain political community. By
contrast, structures can be understood as external determinants defining
the position of the state and its economy in a complex system of interna-
tional dependencies. According to Anna Sosnowska, the opposition be-
tween institutions and structures in practice often comes down to “choosing
the level of analysis: the internal, often national or external, often transna-
tional, and ultimately global” (Sosnowska, 2004, p. 21).
Representatives of the institutional approach argue that an unfavorable
geopolitical position of the state or harsh climate conditions do not neces-
sarily have to compromise its chances for a successful modernization and
civilization progress. Finding the right comparative advantages and
launching internal development impulses, such as transparent regulations,
an efficient court system, highly skilled workforce, effective mechanisms
of interest representation, unobstructed paths of social upward mobility
and a successful political strategy can lessen backwardness and reduce the
distance from the more developed countries. Unlike institutionalists, rep-
resentatives of the structural approach in the analysis of development pro-
cesses tend to believe that hostile external surrounding can thwart even the
most inventive and creative synergy of internal development potentials.
A centuries-long location on the periphery or semi-periphery of the world
determines the position of countries in the international division of labor
as well as the structure of their foreign trade and their place on the map of
global investment flows.
Institutionalists often purport that representatives of the structuralist
approach have a tendency to think deterministically; that they are prone to
excessive pessimism in the evaluation of development opportunities for
individual countries; and that they provide a justification for a lack of stra-
tegic thinking and the absence of an autonomous concept of a development
policy. They, in turn, are often accused by structuralists of overestimating
the role of internal resources and a failure to recognize the importance of
external and international context for development processes. It should be
noted that the division into institutionalists and structuralists does not al-
ways correspond with the distinction between optimists and pessimists as
far as evaluating the development prospects of certain states is concerned.
Advocates of the institutional approach argue that even the most desirable
and beneficial conflux of external development trends may not be suffi-
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cient to modernize the state if it is not accompanied by autonomous and ef-
ficient internal institutions. Some structuralists are inclined to think that
states in fact do not exist as independent and autonomous entities; that
they are no more than a derivative of external structures and international
forces beyond their control; therefore certain regional development trends
may propel the dynamic economic growth of a country.
This dualism can be regarded as a form of a classical theoretical dis-
pute in the humanities and social science concerning the relationship be-
tween the subject and structure. The essence of this dilemma consists of an
attempt to recognize the extent to which social actors (in this case states)
are able to make their own choices and shape their own lives, and to which
their lives are structured beyond their control and determined by external
forces (McAnulla, 2006, p. 273; Wieviorka, 2011, p. 17). This conundrum
is more of a fundamental philosophical question and one should not look
for a final and ultimate solution. One should be aware though that such
a dichotomy exists and has its indisputable consequences; i.e. that attribut-
ing primacy to subjects or structures entails certain methodological and
epistemological consequences, which ultimately affects the final outcome
of research.
What’s more, the above described distinction, although important in
the academic reflection, to a certain extent has a contractual nature in the
research carried out on growth and development policies of states. Repre-
sentatives of both perspectives acknowledge that the connection between
internal and external factors and their impact on the development of cer-
tain countries is dynamic, not static; and that it varies depending on each
analyzed case. In other words, to participate in the dispute about the sub-
ject and structure means to take a stand on the relative importance of inten-
tional and structural factors in any particular case (McAnulla, 2006,
p. 276).
Global Convergence of Capitalism and the Modernization Theory
In the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold
War conflict, institutions whose one of the key tasks was to reduce the dis-
tance from the most developed Western countries, disappeared from main-
stream academia and major intellectual debates. This process was caused
both by a popular belief in the global convergence of capitalism and the
modernization theory, which prevailed in the sociology of that time.
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In the early 1990s, realistic thinking about the creation and manage-
ment of institutions was hindered by the atmosphere of optimism brought
about by the new international situation and incipient ideological orienta-
tion that dominated the Western political and philosophical reflection until
the end of the twentieth century. In the summer of 1989, American politi-
cal scientist Francis Fukuyama, in a memorable article published in the
“National Interest”, developed later in his book, stated that liberal democ-
racy may be “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and “the
final form of human government” constituting the real end of history
(Fukuyama, 2009, p. 9). Fukuyama’s claim became one of the sources of
the increasingly popular and widespread notion of the convergence of the
to date diversified socio-economic systems into one universal Western
model of capitalism. Under the influence of globalization, the next stage
of the scientific and technological revolution and the diffusion of modern
communication technologies, different national economic systems were
supposed to become similar to one another and gradually converge into
one universal Western model. It were to consist of three pillars: a free-
-market economy, a liberal democracy and deep respect for universal hu-
man rights. Acceptance of such a belief by most ruling elites and opinion
leaders had important implications. In such an intellectual atmosphere the
issue of traditions, to which the institutional models of a political system
and market economy built in the transforming countries referred, ceased
to be so crucial. The question of whether they resemble the institutional ar-
rangements of the Nordic model, the German social market economy, the
French model or the Anglo-Saxon one, was no longer posed so repeti-
tively, since all of these hitherto varying systems were heading in the same
direction, which was universal Western capitalism.
At the same time, the sociological discourse was to a large extent
shaped by the increasingly popular modernization theory. As noted by
Anna Sosnowska, the dominant conceptualization of social change after
1989 excluded theories other than the modernization theory, such as theo-
ries of dependency, the world-system or globalization (Sosnowska, 2004,
p. 12). From all of the above mentioned approaches, the modernization
theory – being one of the few “non-Marxist, pro-liberal and pro-capitalis-
tic theories of change and social development” (Sosnowska, 2004, p. 15)
– closely corresponded to the atmosphere of euphoria, elation and opti-
mism after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The modernization theory largely
shaped the transition paradigm which analyzed countries in a process of
major systemic transformations. It was driven by the belief that after the
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fall of the Berlin Wall countries of Central and Eastern Europe which were
to introduce political and economic reforms should simply follow the
modernization path of the most developed countries. This task consisted
of copying the social practices and forms of organization already existing
in the most developed Western democracies. It was believed that societies
of the region were in fact culturally similar to Western ones; it should be
easy though to stimulate the habits and skills that characterize citizens of
Western societies. As part of this approach, external factors, especially
processes of economic globalization, opening markets to capital, manage-
ment and know-how from abroad, were considered to be a crucial modern-
ization force. As indicated by Krzysztof Jasiecki “an important aspect of
modernization concept was, among others, emphasizing the special role of
external factors, taking into account geopolitical transformations of the
world, the possibility of external political support, economic aid and the
increasing openness of international markets” (Jasiecki, 2013, p. 26).
Those were representatives of different variants of the modernization the-
ory who identified international corporations as key instruments of reduc-
ing the distance from the richest countries of the world. Global companies
were thought to be the main channels of investment and capital inflows
that were to generate fundamental economic and social changes and ulti-
mately enable civilization progress.
The most radical advocates of concepts of convergence of capitalism and
the modernization theory emphasized the role of internal organizations and
the quality and efficiency of their operations; but only if they constituted
a prerequisite for both penetration of external forces such as financial capital
or foreign direct investment, and placing these forces within the domestic
context. As an example, the Washington Consensus, which was a set of mac-
roeconomic policy recommendations for developing countries formulated in
the late 1980s by the United States and international organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and International Trade Organi-
zation, included a number of internal reforms. These were, among others, an
introduction of competitive exchange rates, a reduction of tax rates and broad-
ening the tax base, privatization, deregulation, protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights, abolishing regulations hindering the free movement of capital, the
opening of financial markets (Williamson, 1990). These recommendations il-
lustrate reforms in the domestic policy, whose primary goal is to increase the
permeability and receptivity to external factors.
Radically different opinions were also formulated. They stressed that
foreign capital and foreign direct investment may conserve the unfavor-
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able economic structure in the hosting country and shape the anti-develop-
ment structure of interest groups, which are not interested in long-term
modernization. However, these claims reached far beyond the consensus
of that time.
The Post-Washington Consensus
Institutions slowly started to return to mainstream intellectual debates,
policy strategies and recommendations formulated by international orga-
nizations for the first time in the late 1990s as a result of a unique conflu-
ence of various processes and events. The decade which passed since the
fall of the Berlin Wall proved that globalization processes manifest them-
selves in the form of multidirectional development trends rather than
global convergence into one universal model. Results of political transfor-
mations and market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe differed de-
pending on the country; at the same time signalling different political
outlook and development prospects for transforming countries. The expe-
rience of financial crises in Russia and Southeast Asia illustrated the vul-
nerability inherent in almost every free-market economy and shed some
light on the dangers connected with too hasty removal of barriers to the
free movement of capital. The emerging alter-globalization movement
was the first such large social movement to question the neo-liberal princi-
ples which governed and organized the global economic system to date.
As a consequence of these processes, as indicated by Krzysztof Jasiecki,
“the conviction that there is only one proper way of organizing a market
economy has lost in significance”; and gave way to the belief that “in the
context of globalization, processes of convergence of economic institu-
tions are at the same time accompanied by a tendency to maintain their
separateness, and by the emerging new configurations of production
forces, leading to different varieties of capitalism; the spectrum of institu-
tional arrangements organizing market economies broadens; and the rela-
tions between social classes and strata and the state become more and
more complex” (Jasiecki, 2013, p. 37).
A symbolic turning point, which marked the first correction of the
dominant intellectual climate of the era, was the year 2003 in which the
Washington Consensus was subjected to major changes. Both the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank acknowledged that the previ-
ous set of recommendations was incomplete; and that the developing
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countries should reach beyond the first generations of macroeconomic and
trade reforms and focus more on institutional reforms. The emerging new
consensus, called the Post-Washington Consensus, emphasized the need
for reducing corruption, the importance of quality and flexibility of insti-
tutions, institutional differentiation appropriate to the existing conditions,
enforceable codes and standards, clarity of regulations, strengthening cor-
porate governance, the role of good governance, vertical and horizontal
policy coherence (see Table 1). This change was interpreted as the first
sign of the transition from understanding institutions only as a context for
markets to seeing the market as a system of interconnected institutions,
shaped by certain political decisions (Pedersen, 2010, p. 627).
Table 1
Crucial policy recommendations in the Washington Consensus and the Post-Washington
Consensus
The Washington Consensus The Post-Washington Consensus
Fiscal Policy Discipline Reducing Corruption
Tax Reform (Broadening the tax base) Improving Quality and Flexibility of Institu-
tions
Market Determined Interest Rates Introducing Enforceable Codes and Standards
Competitive Interest Rates Clarity of Regulations
Trade Liberalization Strengthening Corporate Governance
Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct
Investment
The Role of Good Governance
Privatization of State Enterprises Vertical Policy Coherence
Deregulation Horizontal Policy Coherence
Source: Author’s own compilation based on: Williamson (1990) and Pedersen (2010).
Institutions in the Polish Systemic Transformation
The first period of the Polish transformation in many ways did not
comply with modern standards which define the creation of institutions. It
would be inadequate to state that in the post-1989 Poland institutions were
no object of consideration. The crucial task that Poland faced following
the fall of the Berlin Wall was defined – in the spirit of all-major-party
consensus – precisely as building mature institutions of a free-market and
democratic system. The notion of institution, however, was often seen
from a limited perspective, which in turn resulted in undertaking actions
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and reforms inappropriate to the challenges a country in the process of
transformation meets.
In the first period of the Polish transformation, stabilizing the main
macroeconomic parameters was the main focus. Actions undertaken at
that time were directed – unsurprisingly – at the narrowly conceived eco-
nomic policy. It has been pointed out that the perception of every economy
as an organic creature which cannot be reformed by changing just one pa-
rameter, if one does not synchronize it with other parts of the system, was
all too rare at that time. For instance, the emergence of an unfavorable
structure of social benefits in the 1990s, which served as a disincentive to
work, clearly had a negative impact on the results achieved in the field of
the economic policy (Zyba³a, 2013, p. 134). It has been noted that the first
period of the Polish systemic transformation was filled with numerous ex-
amples of situations in which the connections and linkages occurring be-
tween the interconnected elements were not taken into consideration by
the policy makers.
Institutional arrangements introduced at the beginning of the Polish
transformation became the subject of many interesting analysis made by
sociologists and political philosophers. Jadwiga Staniszkis formulated
a claim about “the incompleteness of the Polish capitalism” (Staniszkis,
2003, p. 105). In her opinion, the adopted strategy of the Polish systemic
transformation was designed to synchronize Poland with the world being
at a different civilization level. This goal imposed rapid social transforma-
tions and dynamic institutional adaptations. These actions brought to life
institutions which were compatible with international business relations
and worked towards meeting the needs of foreign capital. Attempts to
build the internal development capacity through the creation of autono-
mous economic centers, such as competitive industry or an efficient bank-
ing sector, were abandoned. As a result, the ownership structure formed in
the most sensitive areas of business networks in Poland, such as consult-
ing services, export industry, trade and real estate, do not facilitate
long-term modernization of a country (Jasiecki, 2013, p. 187). Another in-
terpretation was presented by British political philosopher John Gray. Ac-
cording to him, systemic transformation in countries of Central and
Eastern Europe was limited to its economic dimension; while in fact it was
a major undertaking that required political consensus, support of large so-
cial groups and a narrative explaining the ultimate objectives of certain
moves. Cultural differences were wrongly conceived as merely “superficial
manifestations of economic factors”, while in fact they were important
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features of transforming societies, determining their future development
prospects (Gray, 2006, p. 87). Consequently, it was forgotten that market
institutions must take into account the cultural environment in which they
operate.
When considering institutional reforms carried out in Central and East-
ern Europe, it is worth recalling a statement made by American economist
Milton Friedman, often considered one of the most important intellectual
fathers of many politicians and economists who implemented reforms in
countries of the region. In 2001, the Noble laureate admitted that he had
been wrong ten years earlier, when he had strongly recommended privat-
ization for countries transforming from a socialist system into a demo-
cratic one. Friedman said that the rule of law and institutions which set the
environment for actual market operations were more important than pri-
vatization. The time that elapsed between 1989 and 2001 and the events
that occurred in many post-socialist countries allowed for an independent
assessment of the systemic transformation and led to the belief in the need
to create more efficient institutions. The public discussion was increas-
ingly dominated by opinions in line with the classical argumentative rep-
ertoire of supporters of the institutional approach.
It was argued that mature institutions restore the socio-economic and
political order most effectively; since they reduce the impact of current
events on the routine operations of the organizations and the society. What
was also noted, institutions have the ability to prevent demands of various
interest groups directed at the state. Thus they allow the state and its au-
thorities to keep to the previously identified priorities instead of continu-
ing to make constant concessions in order to satisfy different interest
groups. In Poland, the increasing popularity of the belief in the importance
of institutions in socio-economic development was supported by the real
policy decisions, the so called second wave of Polish reforms.
Inclusiveness and Participation
The renaissance of the institutional approach, which may have been
observed in the recent years, manifests itself mostly in the debate sparked
by the global economic crisis symbolically triggered by the fall of Ameri-
can investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008. The largest economic crisis
since the Great Depression of the 1930s is rightly defined as a paradigm
shift in thinking about the processes of economic growth, prospects for the
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capitalist system and the mechanism of effective social and economic pol-
icies (Castells, Caraça, Cardoso, 2012). It may be observed in the fact
that after 2008 not only were instruments and tools used to date in sectoral
policies criticized but also the ultimate goals of the broadly defined devel-
opment policy were questioned. Many distinguished scholars challenged
the very idea of continuous economic growth in their latest publications,
arguing that it is possible to achieve and sustain prosperity and social de-
velopment without permanently increasing the GDP (Jackson, 2009; Ski-
delsky, Skidelsky, 2012; Welzer, 2013). The central point of the debate,
however, has been an attempt to find new sources of growth and develop-
ment impulses in the world after the crisis. One of the intellectual currents
in this debate calls for the re-appreciation of the role and importance of
institutions.
In the academic reflection, the new wave of popularity of the approach
which places institutions at its core is associated with the widely-dis-
cussed work Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity and
Poverty written by Turkish American economist Daron Acemoglu and
American political scientist James Robinson. In this work, which is a re-
sult of prolonged research on the sources of success and causes of failure
of certain countries all over the world, authors come to the conclusion con-
cerning the fundamental and decisive role of institutions in ensuring
the long-term political and economic development and social welfare
(Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012). According to Acemoglu and Robinson, the
most crucial factor for the success of the state is the following one: the
ability to produce inclusive political institutions that ensure the maximal
participation of different social groups in the generated wealth. Those are
inclusive political institutions supplemented by inclusive economic insti-
tutions that are capable of enhancing the welfare of ordinary people.
American researchers also highlight the issue of the transformation of in-
stitutions. The transformation occurs as a result of interaction between
the existing institutions and the so-called critical junctures. Critical junc-
tures are major events that disrupt the existing political and social order,
change the previously established balance and upset the status quo.
Events that according to Acemoglu and Robinson were those critical
junctures in the history were, among others, the opening of the Atlantic
trade routes, which created enormous profit opportunities for the coun-
tries of Western Europe, and the Industrial Revolution, which caused dy-
namic changes of social and economic structure in many countries
around the world.
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The degree of inclusiveness of institutions determines their flexibility
and ability to change the current mode of functioning when some signifi-
cant change occurs outside. Inclusive institutions are able to keep up with
the reality, adapt to the changed environment and develop an appropriate
modus operandi in qualitatively new conditions. Societies whose institu-
tions are characterized by a low level of inclusiveness are not capable of
doing that. As a consequence, they are maladapted to the changed circum-
stances. Most societies which in different historical periods faced difficul-
ties previously unknown to them, failed to meet the challenge and as
a result become extinct, were characterized by one common feature. At the
moment when a major change in the external reality occurred, these soci-
eties focused on intensifying exactly those strategies that had hitherto
been successful and thus ensured their survival; not understanding that
a new situation requires new responses and new concepts.
Key findings and basic claims formulated by Acemoglu and Robinson
were supported by many prominent scholars. Authors were appreciated for,
among others, “brilliantly synthesizing the work of theorists from Adam
Smith to Douglass North with more recent empirical research” and “demon-
strating that history and geography need not be destiny”. Some interesting
critical remarks were also voiced. It was argued that as for the key impor-
tance authors attached to the inclusiveness of institutions, the concept itself
was not defined precisely enough. It was noted that if inclusive institutions
seem to include formal property rights, court systems, modern electoral de-
mocracy, an impersonal centralized state, access to legal institutions and
forms of political participation; then these phenomena are way too broad
and diversified to “be thrown into one basket” and characterized collec-
tively (Fukuyama, 2012). What’s more, real-world societies are some
combination of extractive and inclusive institutions (Fukuyama, 2012).
Therefore, it is worth knowing how every single component of inclusive-
ness mentioned by American researchers separately affects growth. It was
also pointed out that the concept proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson may
be helpful in understanding the rapid economic transformations in Britain
after the Industrial Revolution, but it fails to interpret the development pro-
cess having occurred in China over the past decades, which is an example
of the most dynamic economic growth in the history of mankind, under
the influence of largely repressive and hostile institutions (The big why,
2012). British weekly “The Economist” admitted that the rationale behind
Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory is convincing; but their work is too
reductive in many aspects, as it analyzes almost everything through the
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prism of economics and ignores important issues such as religion and intel-
lectual achievements (Historians versus economists, 2012).
The debate on Why Nations Fail clearly shows that institutions do not
provide a full and complete answer to the complex question of sources of
the state’s economic performance and overall success. Researchers such
as Sheri Berman, Mark Blyth, Bob Jessop and Stijn Oosterlynck argued
that inclusiveness and flexibility alone do not solely determine the adapta-
tion mechanisms implemented by institutions at times of economic crises
or political turmoil (Berman, 2006; Blyth, 2002; Blyth 2013; Jessop,
Oosterlynck, 2008). The interpretation of particular events is also signifi-
cant, involving the manner in which social actors explain what they en-
counter, as well as the ideas by means of which they perceive the social
reality and define their own goals. As shown by the representatives of his-
torical institutionalism, institutions are to some extent autonomous from
individuals, they impose a limited set of choices available to individuals.
In routine situations, after having reached a certain level of functional ma-
turity and formalization of procedures, institutions can automatically
model and shape the behavior of actors. However, in the circumstances of
some significant change, institutions themselves do not respond to struc-
tures. Those are attitudes, beliefs and interpretations of actors that affect
certain institutional responses.
Varieties of Capitalism
An upsurge in popularity of the institutional approach, which may
have been observed in the latest academic reflection, results directly from
the diverse consequences of the global economic crisis observed in the
real economies all over the world. They proved beyond doubt that there is
no such thing as a universal Western model of capitalism. Instead, there
are various models of free-market economies, whose different internal in-
stitutional architecture affects different degrees of susceptibility to exter-
nal economic disturbances. Seven years which passed since the beginning
of the global economic crisis were marked by a new wave of popularity of
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) which is an approach in the social science
(Hall, Soskice, 2001). As part of this approach, two main types of capital-
ism are distinguished, i.e. liberal market economies (LMEs), exemplified
by the USA, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), exemplified by
Germany. Between these two opposite poles, there extends a broad spec-
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trum of countries with different socio-economic systems as well as differ-
ent proportions of solutions specific for the liberal and coordinated model.
This typology tries to go beyond the already known division of capitalism
according to the national types, which usually focuses on tax systems, so-
lutions in the social policy, the scale of national income redistribution or
prevailing cultural habits in the business negotiations. The varieties of
capitalism approach takes into consideration also the ways in which com-
panies use the available assets in the social sphere and institutional support
in the public sphere. One of the key areas of analysis is the relationship be-
tween companies and their surroundings.
This approach is based on an observation that capitalism, like any
socio-economic system existing in the real world, operates within a partic-
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Fig. 1. Complementarities Across Subsystems in the German Coordinated Market
Economy
Source: Hall, Soskice (2001).
ular political, social and cultural frame. Therefore, there is no single uni-
versal Western capitalism. Within the capitalist world economy, there are
different socio-economic models, which are characterized among others
by different labor market regulations, institutional interrelations, models
of interest representation, degrees of power granted to employers and em-
ployees, the ways of shaping and implementing public policies. Two op-
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Source: Hall, Soskice (2001).
posite types distinguished in the institutional Varieties of Capitalism
approach, which are coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal
market economies (LMEs), differ among others in terms of: their competi-
tion policy, methods of technology transfer, education and training system
(see Figures 1 and 2).
Conclusions
The interest in institutions is another sign of a major intellectual
change which has been observed since the beginning of the global eco-
nomic crisis in 2008. It denotes a gradual shift towards a greater amount of
realism and appreciation of the internal factors in designing development
strategies of an individual state. This movement is in no way homoge-
neous. Its pluralism is attested, among others, by a broad range of diversi-
fied and often contradictory definitions of an institution, the latter used by
its representatives. Further discussion and research shall reveal whether
this new wave constitutes a qualitative change in relation to the new
institutionalism already known since the 1990s. The renaissance of insti-
tutions has to some extent been inspired and supported by contemporary
global processes. Some commentators claim that the latest international
events are gradually spreading the belief, that in years to come we will be
living in a world of “parallel realties”. This notion is becoming more and
more powerful, especially among the Western elites. The ideas such as the
end of history, global convergence of capitalism or the universal Western
model, are slowly becoming a thing of the past giving way to a belief in the
necessity of acceptance of radical diversity. A crucial part of the world of
“parallel realities” will involve variety and pluralism of institutional
and socio-economic models, also in the West. This observation may have
important implications also for the policies devised and implemented
in Poland.
As it was repeatedly pointed out, there has been no serious public de-
bate on the political and institutional model of the market economy insti-
tuted in Poland after 1989. Over the years, researchers of the Polish public
discourse have been pointing out a paradoxical situation in which a signif-
icant part of the public debates is misplaced, i.e. it is filled with voices call-
ing for the necessary reforms, while at the same time it lacks any major
interest in their content. Discussions on Poland’s absorption of the EU
structural funds within the new financial perspective 2014–2020 focus on
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the total amount of financial aid and the pace of their spending, instead of
concentrating on the areas of allocation and their long-term growth poten-
tial, which is just another sign of this major flaw of Polish public dis-
course. Authors of report “The Course Towards Innovation. How to move
Poland from development drift” made a claim about “the institutional
weakness of the state and public administration in the face of new eco-
nomic trends,” which can be observed among others in the gradual disap-
pearance of public space as a place of discussions about the importance
of strategic thinking and autonomous development strategy (Geodecki,
Gorzelak, Górniak, Hausner, Mazur, Szlachta, Zaleski, 2012). A new
wave of popularity of institutions, described in the text, may provide an
opportunity for correcting this flaw and seriously reconsidering the role,
importance and adequacy of Polish institutions in relation to the key de-
velopment challenges.
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Powrót instytucji. O najnowszych zmianach w badaniach rozwoju
spo³eczno-ekonomicznego
Streszczenie
Rozwa¿ania podjête w tekœcie koncentruj¹ siê wokó³ roli instytucji w procesach
rozwoju spo³eczno-gospodarczego pañstw. Przedmiotem szczególnej uwagi jest jeden
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z wymiarów funkcjonowania instytucji, przejawiaj¹cy siê w rozumieniu ich jako efek-
tywnych instrumentów redukowania dystansu rozwojowego wobec pañstw zachod-
nich. W tekœcie zauwa¿ono, i¿ w pierwszych latach po roku 1989 instytucje zniknê³y
z g³ównego nurtu wa¿nych debat intelektualnych. Wskazano g³ówne Ÿród³a tego pro-
cesu: 1) popularne w latach 90. XX wieku przekonanie o globalnej konwergencji kapi-
talizmu oraz 2) dominuj¹c¹ w ówczesnej socjologii teoriê modernizacji. W artykule
postawiono tezê, i¿ instytucje wróci³y do centrum debat akademickich i strategii roz-
wojowych z powodu splotu nastêpuj¹cych procesów i wydarzeñ: 1) szerokiej debaty
poœwiêconej instytucjonalnym Ÿród³om wzrostu i rozwoju zapocz¹tkowanej publika-
cj¹ pracy Darona Acemoglu i Jamesa Robinsona Why Nations Fail, 2) globalnego kry-
zysu ekonomicznego z roku 2008 zainicjowanego upadkiem amerykañskiego banku
inwestycyjnego Lehman Brothers, 3) zró¿nicowanym konsekwencjom kryzysu eko-
nomicznego, jakie mo¿na dostrzec w USA i w Europie, które ilustruj¹, 4) instytucjo-
naln¹ ró¿norodnoœæ kapitalizmu.
S³owa kluczowe: instytucje, nowy instytucjonalizm, rozwój spo³eczno-gospodarczy,
dystans rozwojowy, instytucjonalna ró¿norodnoœæ kapitalizmu
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